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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
UTAH COPPER COMPANY, 
A CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH, AND UTAH 
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
f, CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
No. 3649 
CERTIORARI 
PROCEEDINGS 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF 
The Power Company's "Additional Brief" deals only 
with the one contention respecting the retroactive 
feature of the order in Case 248. This is, therefore, all 
that we will discuss herein. 
THE QUESTION IS NOT RES JUDICATA. 
The Power Co. urges that the decision of this Court 
in Case 230 is res judicata, on the theory that it was 
expressly passed upon by this Court, or, if not, was 
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at least inferentially passed upon by the general affirm-
ance of the order in Case 230. The question certainly 
was not expressly passed upon. The opinion of the 
Court did not even mention, much less discuss, the 
effect of the provisions of Sections 4785, 4800 and 
4830, C. L. 1917. Not only did the decision of the 
Court fail to expressly pass upon this question, but, 
on the contrary, this Court, upon the petition for the 
rehearing, stated the question accurately by saying 
that it was whether or not the Commission had the 
power to make or enforce the temporary rates; and the 
Court then expressly and unequivocally said that "that 
question was not, nor was it intended to be, decided 
in any of those cases." 
The Power Co. says that the Court knows what it 
intended to decide and did decide, and adds that it is 
perhaps presumptious to argue to the Court which 
rendered a decision, what was decided thereby. It 
need only be said that the Court rendered its decision 
in the English language, and litigants have a right 
to accept and rely upon the express, unambiguous and 
unequivocal language of the Court saying that it did 
not decide, nor intend to decide, the question raised. 
The Power Co. urges that the question was infer-
entially necessarily decided by the general affirmance 
of the order in Case 230, on the theory that the principle 
involved lay at the foundation of the order in Case 
230. · In making its order in Case 230, the Commission, 
under the statute as construed by this Court, was 
authorized to interfere with the contract. That it did. 
It was then authorized, and under the statute it was its 
duty, to find and declare the reasonable rate to be 
paid by the consumer. That it did not do. Frankness 
demands that we state that we regarded those two 
powers of the Commission and those two duties of the 
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Commission as interlocking, and therefore we made a spe-
cific attack upon the order in Case 230 for its omission to 
find and declare the reasonable rate as required by 
the statute. We thought that the Court should and 
would pass upon that question with respect to the 
order in Case 230. However, the Court did not do 
so, and expressly says that it did not do so, and expressly 
says that it did not intend to do so. The only explanation 
for the Court's attitude towards this question is that it 
regarded the order in Case 230, insofar as it dealt with 
this rate feature, as possibly only an interlocutory order 
and not a final order, and that the question could best 
be dealt with and determined when the Commission had 
finally acted vvith respect to rates by making its order 
in Case 248. Accordingly, when we came to review the 
orc1er in Case 248, we renewed the question. 
Tl:e Copper Co. had a right to have that question 
exp<:>essly passed upon. It had a right to have it re-
vicY,"Cd in connection with the order in Case 230. It 
hac; ?, ri.<rht to have it reviewed in connection with 
the ordrr in ~ase 248. The question is not a mere 
technical one; it is a substantial one involving practi-
cally a quarter of a million dollars. The Copper Co. has 
done everything prescribed by procedural or remedial 
law to protect itself with respect to the question raised. 
Now the Power Co. seeks, on the technical doctrine 
of res judicata, to forever , prevent the Court from 
passing upon the question, simply because the Court 
declined to pass upon it in reviewing the order in 
Case No. 230. Such a result would be intolerable. 
Whether it would be good J::\w is for this Court to say; 
but certainly it would not be justice or fair play. When 
a litigant raiseR a qneEd:ion and attempts to have it de-
termined, and the Court expressly declines to determine 
it, there is no justice or fairness in refusing to again 
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entertain the question when again presented, in a new 
proceeding, against a new order, and put that refusal 
on the ground that the question had already been de-
termined inferentially, despite the Court's express state-
ment that the question had not been determined. 
The Power Co. says that the effect of the Court's 
now entertaining this question and deciding it in favor 
of the Copper Co., would be to leave the customer 
in the position of being required to pay Schedule 43 
rates, and that, therefore, we are seeking to review 
a portion of the order "which is of benefit to the 
customer." We hardly see wherein an order which 
takes a quarter of a million dollars illegally is a benefit 
to the Copper Co. Aside from this, the suggestion 
of the Power Co. is untenable, not only because Schedule 
43 rates have been declared unreasonable, but also 
because if the Copper Company's position on the merits 
of the question presented is sound, then the Copper 
Co. would only be required to pay the contract rnte 
up to the time that the Commission established the 
new reasonable rate. This destroys the sophistical sug-
gestion that the order is of any benefit to the Copper 
Co. Furthermore, this suggestion bears upon the merits 
of the question, and not upon the point of res ju,dioota. 
It will not do to confound the two propositions. The 
Court cannot decline to entertain the question on the 
theory of res j'ndicatn because of any view it may hold 
or not hold respecting the merits of the question. 
In 23 Cyc. 1226, it is said that a judgment to be 
res judicata: 
"Should be free from irreconcilable contradic-
tions and ambiguities which cannot be cleared 
away." 
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And in 23 Cyc. 1292, it is said that: 
"The estoppel cannot be extended to matters 
which the judgment expressly declares not to 
have been in issue in the action in which it was 
rendered or to have been omitted from considera-
tion therein." 
And in 23 Cyc. 1297, it is said: 
"The estoppel of a judgment does not extend 
to matters not expressly adjudicated and which 
can only be inferred by argument or construc-
tion from the judgment." 
In 15 R. C. L. 955, it is said: 
"If the real merits of the suit are not deter-
mined in the prior decision, the judgment will 
not be a bar." 
In 15 R. C. L. 980, it is said that a plea of res 
.iud1:cata is insufficient, unless it appears that the issue 
or qr;estion was: 
"Positively decided in such former action 
against the present plaintiff." 
The plea of res judicata should not be sustained in 
this case. The issues are not identical. A new order 
is here under review and it brings before the Court 
facts which did not exist at the time the original or 
foundational order was entered. 
The question presented was expressly withdrawn and 
withheld by the Court in passing upon the order in 
Case 230. The Court's opinion on the application for 
rehearing as to the former order expressly states that 
this question was omitted from consideration therein. 
The real merits of the question were not decided, nor 
vv-ere they intended to be decided, by the judgment as 
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to the other order. The question is one which in effect 
was expressly reserved by the Court's opinion in the 
former case. The question is now open. The Copper 
Go. should not be hurt by any act of the law. The 
Court should pass upon the question raised. It did 
not do so in the former case. It should do so in this 
case to the end that somewhere, somehow, the rights 
of the Copper Co. with respect to this matter may be 
determined. A gross wrong has been done the Copper 
Co. For every wrong, the law provides a remedy. The 
pending proceeding affords that remedy. 
REPLY ARGUMENT ON THE MERITS. 
The Power Co. says Schedule 43 rates would have been 
applicable to the Copper Company's service but for 
the contract. It urges that this is evidenced by the 
fact that for 8000 H. P. in excess of the 31000 H. P. 
covered by the contract, the Copper Co. paid at Schedule 
43 rates. That has nothing to do with this case. The 
question here involves only the rate for the 31000 H. P. 
for which there was a contract. Of course, after the 
Utilities Act was passed and the schedules filed, the 
schedule rates had to apply to service not embraced 
within a pre-existing contract. But that does not 
destroy the express requirement of our statute that as 
to service embraced in a pre-existing contract the Com-
mission, upon interfering with such contract, should find 
and prescribe the reasonable rates to be thereafter 
observed. It is certainly astounding to contemplate 
the omnipotence of the Power Co. By merely filing a 
piece of paper it has succeeded in striking down consti-
tutional limitations, and wiping out a clause of the 
statute, and now seeks to induce the Court to ignore 
three more express requirements of the statute. 
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The Power Co. next attempts to excuse the failure 
of Schedule 43 to carry any symbol denoting any 
advance in rates as required by the Commission's 
Tariff Circular No. 3. It seeks so to do because that 
schedule recited that it was effective on March 1, 1917, 
and therefore the Power Co. says it was filed previously 
to the issuance of that Tariff Circular. There are two 
answers to this, viz. : ( 1) the uncontradicted fact 
shown by the certiorari record in Case No. 3582, in 
this Court, at page 8, is that the schedule was not 
filed until after the circular, although the Power Co. 
had had such an unfiled schedule previously; and (2) 
circular, or no circular, the schedule was not filed until 
after the passage of the statute, and the statute itself 
(Sec. 4785) required that attention be directed to any 
rate advance by an appropriate symbol. All this argu-
ment of the Power Co. is shown in its true light, when 
Y'e remember the fact that the schedule was not 
rlef,i gned to increase contract rates, not only because 
the Power Co. had no right to ignore its contracts, 
but also because it continued billing at the contract 
rates and not schedule rates for over two years before 
the Commission started the investigation. The Court 
can feel reasonably sure that the Power Co. would 
have billed on the schedule if it felt that such schedule 
was designed to, or operated to, affect the contract 
service rate. 
The Power Co. says it was impossible to make the 
special contracts conform to that rate advance require-
ment. That is another suggestion thrown in to cloud 
the proposition. The question is whether the schedule 
rate affected the contracts. The schedule had to 
measure up to certain requirements to effect such a 
result. It did not do so. There was no requirement 
that any contract should carry any such symbol. 
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In the last place, the Power Co. says that this pro-
vision, designed to give the public notice of rate 
advances, should be treated by the Court as merely 
directory and not mandatory, and therefore the failure 
of the schedule to comply with the statute is to be 
disregarded as a mere irregularity. This merits no 
answer. 
The Power Co. refers to the opinion of Mr. Justice 
Gideon as destroying the contracts. That was not the 
opinion of a majority of the Court. Furthermore, 
that opinion overlooks the distinction between contracts 
made prior to the pP.ssage of the Act, and those made 
subsequently. That is certainly a reasonable basis for 
classification. It is passing strange to say that obedi-
ence to a constitutional mandate against the impair-
ment of pre-existing contracts renders a statute un-
constitutional for improper classification. 
The Power Co. says the contention is technical and 
subversive of justice. Of course, in their view anything 
is technical which requires either the Power Co. or 
the Commission to comply with the mandate of the 
statute. True, if the Commission had declared Sche-
dule 43 rates reasonable, or had fixed new rates 
in its October order, this question could not have 
arisen. But the "mummery of words" the Power 
Co. complains of happens to be a statutory re-
quirement. To follow a statutory mandate may 
be regarded as "archaic legal procedure," in these 
modern days when we have passed from the divine 
right of kings to the divine right of majorities; but 
after all, the statute is the voice of those majorities, 
and this requirement of the statute was put in there 
so that the consumers might know in advance the 
exact rate they would be called upon to pay. The Com-
mission never found Schedule 43 rates reasonable as 
9 
applied to our service. On the contrary, it foun·d them 
unreasonable. The "spirit of the Act," and "justice 
and equity" (as viewed by the courts rendering the 
decisions cited on pages 15 and 16 of our main brief 
herein) demanded that the agreed rate should be the 
only lawful rate until the Commission found and 
declared a new reasonable rate, in accordance with the 
statute. 
The Power Co. next contends that the order of the 
Commission in Case 230 making the schedule rate 
applicable to the service, was equivalent to an approval 
of those rates and to a finding of their reasonableness. 
That is not true because that very order said that 
question had not been determined and ordered the 
Power Co. to stand ready to make reparation; and 
ultimately those rates were found unreasonable and 
reduced. So the Commission never approved Schedule 
43 rates and never found them reasonable as applied 
to this contract service. 
The Power Co. says it was the right and duty of the 
Commissinn to fix temporary rates for this contract 
service pending its completion of the investigation 
and establishment of the reasonable rate, and cites 
Fort Smith & W.' R. Co. v. State, and Muskogee Gas. & 
E. Co. v. State, and Omaha & C. B. St. R. v. Commission. 
Those cases are not in point. In none of them was a 
statutory provision involved such as we have here. 
In none of them was any pre-existing contract involved. 
The first case merely held that there was sufficient 
evidence to justify attaching a prim,a facie validity to 
an order condemning a schedule rate. The second case 
merely held that the Commission could, upon proper 
evidence, fix temporary rates to meet war emergencies, 
without making a technical valuation of the utility's 
property. That has nothing to do with the question 
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here presented. The third case is to exactly the same 
effect, and has no bearing here. The Commission 
in Case 248 promulgated these new rates as temporary 
emergency rates pending a valuation of the Power 
Company's property. If we were attacking those rates 
on the theory that a valuation was a condition prece-
dent to fixing the rates, those decisions would be directly 
in point. But obviously that is not the question here 
presented. No such statutory requirement, on a con-
tract case, such as we are here dealing with, was 
involved in any of those decisions cited by the Power Co. 
The Power Co. also contends that the fact that a 
tariff rate is under attack as unreasonable gives a 
consumer no right to a different rate pending the 
determination of such attack, and the ascertainment 
of the reasonable rate, and cites Suburban Water Cc. 
v. Oakmont, and Texas & P. Ry. v·. Abilene Oil Co. 
That proposition and those cases have no relevancy 
to the question here at issue. The first of those cases 
merely presented a situation where a tariff rate was in 
effect, and a patron, without any contract, sought 
service, but contended that the schedule rate was 
unreasonably high. He took the service and declined 
to pay the bill. It was merely held that he had to 
pay the bill and seek reparation through the Commis-
sion. That case has nothing to do with the question 
here involved. This is a different situation under a 
specific and different statutory provision. The second 
case cited by the Power Co. merely held that a state 
court had no jurisdiction to declare an interstate freight 
rate unreasonable, as that issue lay with the Inter-
state Commerce Commission in the first instance. What 
that has to do with the question here presented is 
beyond our comprehension. So the Kinn;avey case 
merely determined what was necessary, under the Act 
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to Regulate Commerce, to l).ttack an interstate rate as 
unreasonable. That case has no bearing on this one. 
The Power Co. also contends that the schedule rates 
were the only lawful rates "except as any customer 
may have been entitled to a different rate by virtue 
of a preserved special contract," and cites Boston Ry. v. 
Hooker, Louisville Ry. v. Maxwell, Louisville Ry. v. 
Dickerson, and Poor Grain Co. v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Every 
one of those cases can be disregarded as not in point. 
They arose under the Federal Act. No such statutory 
provision as we have here was there involved. There 
is not the slightest analogy in the facts. The Hooker 
case merely involved the validity of a limitation for 
loss of baggage. The Maxwell case and the Poor Grain 
Co. case merely hold that where there is an existing 
tariff freight rate, a shipper~ must pay that rate, even 
though a station agent makes a mistake in naming 
a lower rate in issuing the bill-of-lading. The Dicker-
sr:?? c::~sc iR to exactly the same effect, except that 
then: the bill--of-lading named too high a rate, and the 
shipper recovered the excess. In none of those cases 
was any pre-existing contract involved. In none of them 
was there any statutory requirement such as we have 
here involved. In State v. Billings Co., cited by the 
Power Co., no such statutory provision was involved as 
we have here. There the Commission was not required 
to do anything. 
The Power Co. says that our contention ignores the 
provision prohibiting any contract differing from pub-
lished schedules and making the schedule rates the 
conclusive lawful rates. That argmnent is sound as 
to all contracts entered into since the passage of the 
Act and the filing of the schedule's, but not as to 
pre-existing contracts. The statute makes the rates 
in antecedent contracts the only lawful rates until 
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the Commission sets aside the contract and establishes 
a new reasonable rate to be thereafter observed, in 
accordance with the statute. 
The Power Co. admits that the Commission must 
follow the statute in increasing any schedule rate. 
It admits that the Commission "must follow the method 
prescribed by the statute in its actions in this respect." 
All we say is that the Commission, in increasing a 
contract rate, fixed by a pre-existing contract, "must 
follow the method prescribed by the statute." 
The Power Go. says that "the error" in 0 1.1r position 
is "in the assumption that both the schedule and 
contract rates are entitled to equal presumptions of 
lawfulness." There is no error. The statute preserved 
the rates named in pre~existing contracts until the 
Commission not only set aside the contract, but also, 
as required by the statute, found and fixed the reason-
able rates to be thereafter observed. 
The authorities cited in our main brief are directly 
in point. They deserve most careful consideration. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DICKSON, ELLIS, LUCAS & ADAMSON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
